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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
court maintaining exceptions of no cause of action and dismissing
plaintiff's suit on the ground that the allegations of the petition
disclosed, contributory negligence was reversed by the Supreme
Court under a writ of review. Plaintiff had brought suit against
the City of New Orleans and the owner of the property abutting
the allegedly defective sidewalk to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by plaintiff's minor son who was thrown from
a bicycle when its front wheel struck a hole in the sidewalk. The
exceptions were overruled under a holding that the allegations
of the petition did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
than the contributory negligence of the boy. In passing, however,
the Supreme Court restated the law with respect to the liability
of a municipality for the defective condition of its sidewalks.
While it was admitted that the city is not an insurer, and need not
maintain its sidewalks in perfect condition, it is required to keep
them reasonably safe. The municipality would be held respon-
sible for injuries to a bicyclist incurred as a result of a dangerous
and sizeable depression in the sidewalk, provided the depressions
were not subject to easy detection by persons exercising ordinary
care and prudence in using the walk.
ZONING ORDINANCES
The single case decided by the Supreme Court during the
past term in which the constitutionality and validity of a munici-
pal ordinance was presented will be discussed in some detail
later.15
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
Four cases touching upon state and local taxation were
decided during the course of the term, and all four of them
involved ad valorem property taxes. To students of taxation,
aware of the fact that less than three per cent of the state's
revenues are derived from this type of levy, this implies that the
term was of no great significance to the taxpayer or his attorney.
In a case of first impression, Lafayette Building Association
v. Spofford,' the court held that the term "taxes" appearing in the
15. State ex rel. Loraine v. Adjustment Board of City of Baton Rouge, 220
La. 708, 57 So. 2d 409 (1952), discussed infra p. 321.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 221 La. 549, 59 So. 2d 880 (1952).
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homestead exemption provision of Article XI of the State Consti-
tution is to be restricted to property taxes on the homestead itself
and does not extend to excise taxes owed by the homesteader.
The constitutional provision confers immunity upon the home-
stead against any process to the extent of four thousand dollars,
but negatives the exemption with respect to claims predicated
upon vendors', mortgagees' and materialmen's liens as well as
"taxes or assessments" (among others). In this case the Collector
of Revenue sought to enforce judgments in favor of the state
against the homesteader based upon unpaid public welfare reve-
nue and chain store taxes and contended that the tax-debtor was
not entitled to invoke the homestead exemption to defeat these
claims.
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Moise wrote a brief
opinion in which he concluded that: "It is clear that the word
'taxes' as used in the constitutional provision refers to property
taxes and was intended to relate directly to the homestead prop-
erty and did not embrace excise taxes."'2 Although there is little
discussion and no citation of authority directly in point, the result
probably accords with the purpose which the provision's framers
had in mind. There is some force in the argument that the lan-
guage of the exception clause of the exemption compels a con-
trary conclusion. That clause says "This exemption (of the home-
stead) shall not apply to the following debts, to-wit: . . .For
taxes or assessments." A judgment for unpaid taxes is certainly
a debt, and there is nothing in the language of the provision that
expressly restricts the proviso to property taxes. At the same
time, however, when one studies the other types of debts which
are excluded from the operation of the homestead exemption-
those relating to the vendor's, mortgagee's and materialmen's
liens-he sees that the primary purpose was to protect the home-
stead from all economic vicissitudes save those involving the
2. 59 So. 2d 880, 881 (1952).
3. There is one exception- Subsection 3 of Section 2 of Article XI removes
from the protection of the homestead exemption all debts "For liabilities
incurred by any public officer, or fiduciary, or attorney at law, for money
collected or received on deposit." In the face of this one clearly different
type of provision, it might be argued with some force that taxes, representing
the taxpayer's public obligation, were also intended to be excepted regardless
of the kind of tax involved. Certainly a fundamental doubt remains since
the provision, as interpreted, now means that the state cannot be denied its
claim for taxes on the property itself, but may at the same time be denied
all other tax claims. This is particularly pertinent in view of the fact, noted
at the outset of this section, that the property tax constitutes less than three
per cent of total state revenues.
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acquisition, repair and retention of the homestead itself. This
type of exception must obviously be made if home ownership is
to be stimulated and investment capital attracted to support it.
Two other cases were suits by the same taxpayer for a refund
of property taxes paid under protest on a twenty-five mile length
of gas pipe line lying in Lake Pontchartrain.4 The pipe line enters
the lake at the water's edge in St. Charles Parish and emerges
therefrom in St. Tammany Parish. Each of the parishes involved
had proceeded upon the theory that their boundaries extended to
the middle of the lake bed, and had assessed and levied property
taxes upon approximately twelve and one-half miles of the tax-
payer's submerged pipeline. The property taxes involved were
state, parish wide, and special road and levee district levies.
The plaintiff, asserting that the creation and description of
parish boundaries is a legislative function, sought to establish
that no such enactments had ever been adopted by the Louisiana
Legislature fixing the boundary between St. Charles and St. Tam-
many Parishes as an imaginary line through the middle of the
lake. Hence, the taxpayer contended, the boundaries of these par-
ishes must be regarded as terminating at the lake's shores, thus
depriving them of taxing jurisdiction. It was conceded that the
lake was within the state.
Going back to the Treaty of Paris, and tracing developments
through intervening events and grants, the court reached the
conclusion that the boundary was at mid-lake, not along the line
of the shore, despite the fact that no clear legislative enactment
has ever spelled it out. This conclusion was supported by refer-
ence to prior jurisprudence in which the court has invoked the
presumption that when the Legislature refers to a body of water
in the course of describing a boundary, it will be taken to intend
the middle or thread of the body. As the court itself remarked,
"The basis for the presumption is that no legislative purpose or
motive can be perceived for the exclusion of a part of the water
course from the territory being bounded."5
As a consequence, the court denied the claim for a refund of
taxes to the extent that state and parish wide (general alimony)
taxes were involved, but affirmed the action of the trial courts in
both cases in granting recovery for taxes paid under road and
4. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Moise, 220 La. 969, 58 So. 2d 197 (1952) and
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Dubroca, 220 La. 991, 58 So. 2d 204 (1952).
5. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Moise, 220 La. 969, 983, 58 So. 2d 197, 202
(1952).
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levee district levies. If there is any basis for criticism of the
decision, it would seem to be on the latter point. In the case of
one of the two road districts involved, the court concluded that
it did not extend into the lake because the legislative act creating
it "specifically limited (the boundary) to the shoreline by numer-
ous and definite and well described calls."6 In the case of the
other road district, the legislative enactment referred to "all
land" which the court concluded could not embrace the lake bed.
After relying upon the presumption that legislative enactments
fixing boundaries along water bodies will be presumed to extend
to the mid point or thread of the body to sustain its opinion on the
main point of the case, the conclusion with respect to the road dis-
tricts, particularly the second one mentioned, seems to come as a
non sequitur. As a practical matter, of course, the taxpayer
received no road benefits with respect to its under water property,
but a logical extension of the principle would lead every farmer
to claim exemption from road district taxes with respect to that
portion of his land covered by ponds, lakes, or streams.
In Warren County, Mississippi v. Hester7 the court adopted
as a rule of decision a dictum which has been a part of our
jurisprudence for almost forty years, namely that the constitu-
tional exemption from ad valorem taxation for "all public prop-
erty"s does not extend to property situated within Louisiana
which is owned by other states or their political subdivisions.
Hence Warren County, Mississippi, owner of the bridge crossing
the Mississippi River at Vicksburg, three-fourths of which lies
within the State of Louisiana, was denied a refund of taxes paid
to Louisiana taxing authorities.
The dictum is found in a 1914 case 9 involving a parcel of land
in the City of New Orleans, alleged to have been owned by the
City of Baltimore, Maryland. On first hearing, this land was held
to be "public property" and exempt from taxation. On rehearing,
however, the court restricted its decision to the narrow ground
that municipally owned property is subject to prescription and
concluded that the City of Baltimore had lost its title to the prop-
erty in this manner. The opinion on rehearing made it clear that
the court had changed its mind on the exemption point, for it
6. 220 La. 969, 990, 58 So. 2d 197, 204.
7. 219 La. 763, 54 So. 2d 12 (1951).
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 4(1).
9. City of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 66
So. 237 (1914).
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plainly intimated that the "public property" exemption was
inapplicable to property owned by the poltical subdivisions of
other states, and cited a leading case from Kansas on the point.10
The decision places our jurisprudence in accord with that of most
other states whose courts have considered the question.,
The taxpayer also sought to establish immunity from taxa-
tion on four other grounds (dedication to public use, the specific
provisions of Article X, Section 4, Paragraph 13 of the Louisiana
Constitution, the full faith and credit and the interstate commerce
clauses of the Federal Constitution), all of which were fairly
clearly unavailing in the light of the specific terms of the pro-
visions invoked, or the jurisprudence interpreting them.
10. State of Kansas ex rel. Taggert v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 Pac. 251,
50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 243 (1911).
